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AN INTERNATIONAL APPROACH TO BREAKING THE 
CORE OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND FAA CONFLICT 
INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration has become the resolution method of choice for parties in 
international business transactions over the past decade. Arbitration’s 
popularity is evident today with an increase of cases at major arbitral 
institutions, such as the International Chamber of Commerce’s International 
Court of Arbitration, which received 599 requests for arbitrations in 2007, an 
almost twenty-fold increase in the past fifty years.1 Additionally, a survey of 
eighty-two large corporations found that 88% of corporate counsel have used 
arbitration at least once, with 38% of the disputes arising from commercial 
transactions.2 Businesses gravitate towards arbitration because of its ability to 
provide “a neutral, speedy[,] and expert dispute resolution process, largely 
subject to the parties’ control, in a single, centralized forum, with 
internationally-enforceable dispute resolution agreements and decisions.”3 
These features are viewed as promoting cost mitigation,4 something parties are 
extremely sensitive to in this economy. 
Commercial arbitration has roots in the Antiquity period of Greece and 
other prominent civilizations.5 The practice continued to develop throughout 
Europe’s history,6 and “[c]onsistent with America’s role in the development of 
state-to-state arbitration in the eighteenth century, arbitration was widely used 
to resolve commercial (and other) disputes during Colonial times and the early 
 
 1 See 1 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 69 (2009). In 2007, a total of 3,235 
arbitration cases were filed amongst the various arbitral institutions, up 132% from 1993. Id. 
 2 PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: CORPORATE ATTITUDES AND PRACTICES 
2008, at 2, 5 (2008), available at http://www.pwc.co.uk/eng/publications/international_arbitration_2008.html. 
 3 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 71. 
 4 Id. at 84 (“It has long been said that arbitration offers a cheaper, quicker means of dispute resolution 
than national court proceedings.”). 
 5 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 10 (2011). 
(“Archaeological research reports that clay tablets from contemporary Iraq recite a dispute between one 
Tulpunnaya and her neighbor, Killi, over water rights in a village near Kirkuk, which was resolved by 
arbitration (with Tulpunnaya being awarded ten silver shekels and an ox) . . . . Arbitration was no less common 
in ancient Greece for the resolution of commercial and other ‘private’ disputes than for state-to-state 
disputes.”). 
 6 Id. at 13–20, 25–26 (noting the development of arbitration in Europe from the Middle Ages through 
the early twentieth century).  
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years of the Republic.”7 However, during the nineteenth century, judges would 
ordinarily refuse to recognize arbitration agreements because of “concern[s] 
about private agreements ‘ousting’ the courts of jurisdiction, skepticism about 
the adequacy and fairness of the arbitral process[,] and suspicions that 
arbitration agreements were often the product of unequal bargaining power.”8 
The Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) was enacted in 1925 to govern arbitrations 
and enforcement actions in the United States,9 with the specific objective to 
eliminate any judicial interference in the enforcement of such agreements.10 
This new federal statute was ardently supported by the business community, 
which had lobbied hard for arbitration reform.11 Despite the FAA, courts were 
hesitant to embrace arbitration agreements, highlighted best by the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Wilko v. Swan, which declined to enforce an arbitration 
agreement in a securities fraud action under the Securities Act of 1933.12 
The enforceability of arbitration agreements in international commercial 
contracts was formally established when the United States agreed to the 
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(the New York Convention) in 1970.13 By the 1970s, the Supreme Court was 
ready to reverse its negative stance on arbitration, starting with Scherk v. 
Alberto-Culver Co., which held the international arbitration agreement 
enforceable for a claim under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 brought by 
a German party against an American party.14 Next, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. 
 
 7 Id. at 20. 
 8 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 133. 
 9 See Federal Arbitration Act, Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883, 883 (1925) (“An Act To make valid and 
enforceable written provisions or agreements for arbitration of disputes arising out of contracts, maritime 
transactions, or commerce among the States or Territories or with foreign nations.”). 
 10 See Paul F. Kirgis, Arbitration, Bankruptcy, and Public Policy: A Contractarian Analysis, 17 AM. 
BANKR. INST. L. REV. 503, 511 (2009) (defining the three primary goals of the FAA as: (1) making agreements 
to arbitrate enforceable, (2) enforcing arbitral awards, and (3) making awards final by limiting judicial review). 
 11 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 133. The business community viewed litigation as “expensive, slow and 
unreliable,” which led New York to enact an arbitration statute in 1920 recognizing the enforceability of 
arbitration agreements in New York courts. Id.  
 12 Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427, 435–38 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. 
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989); see also Kirgis, supra note 10, at 512 (“The [Wilko] Court focused on the 
inadequacy of arbitration as a substitute for formal adjudication.”). 
 13 See Lindsay Biesterfeld, Note, Parties to International Commercial Arbitration Agreements Beware: 
Bankruptcy Trumps Supreme Court Precedent Favoring Arbitration of International Disputes, 2006 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 273, 279. “Congress incorporated the Convention into the United States Arbitration Act. The United 
States Arbitration Act requires the courts to recognize and enforce arbitration agreements between parties to an 
international commercial contract.” Id. at 279–80 (footnote omitted).  
 14 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 508–09, 519–20 (1974); see also Fred Neufeld, 
Enforcement of Contractual Arbitration Agreements Under the Bankruptcy Code, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 525, 
532 (1991). Scherk did not overrule Wilko, but the Supreme Court noted “that the refusal to enforce arbitration 
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v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., the Supreme Court expanded the 
enforceability of international commercial arbitration clauses to actions 
alleging violation of the Sherman Act.15 In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, the Court found no congressional intent to impede arbitration in 
claims under both RICO and the 1934 Securities Act.16 Lastly, the Supreme 
Court overruled Wilko in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, 
Inc., expressing that Wilko “was incorrectly decided and is inconsistent with 
the prevailing uniform construction of other federal statutes governing 
arbitration agreements in the setting of business transactions.”17 These 
decisions are the key to gleaning insight into whether the Supreme Court 
would enforce arbitration in bankruptcy, given that “[t]he four statutory areas 
that federal appellate courts [had] carved out as exceptions to the Arbitration 
Act [were] securities law, antitrust law, RICO, and bankruptcy law.”18 At the 
same time that the Supreme Court was adopting “a radically pro-arbitration 
agenda,”19 Congress was making large substantive changes to the federal 
bankruptcy law.20  
The National Bankruptcy Act of 1898 created the first modern and 
permanent uniform bankruptcy law and bankruptcy courts.21 However, the 
bankruptcy courts had limited jurisdiction and were only able to address issues 
involving case administration, the debtor’s property, other areas allowed by the 
1898 Act, or where the parties had consented to the court’s jurisdiction; all 
other disputes were decided by either state or district courts.22 This resulted in 
 
clauses in international agreements ‘would surely damage the fabric of international commerce and trade, and 
imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter into international agreements.’” Neufeld, supra, at 
532–33 (quoting Scherk, 417 U.S. at 517). 
 15 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 636–40 (1985); see also 
Neufeld, supra note 14, at 535. 
 16 See Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987); see also Neufeld, supra 
note 14, at 537 (“Regarding the 1934 Act claims, the Court said that Wilko v. Swan only made sense at a time 
when arbitration was seen as inadequate to enforce the statutory rights afforded by the federal securities 
laws.”).  
 17 Rodriguez de Quijas, 490 U.S. at 484–85; see also Neufeld, supra note 14, at 537–38. 
 18 Neufeld, supra note 14, at 535. Thus, bankruptcy is the only exception that the Supreme Court has yet 
to address. 
 19 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 512. 
 20 See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. 
§§ 101–1330 (2006)). 
 21 Patrick M. Birney, L.L.M. Thesis, Reawakening Section 1334: Resolving the Conflict Between 
Bankruptcy and Arbitration Through an Abstention Analysis, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 619, 640 (2008); 
see also Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1978). 
 22 Birney, supra note 21, at 641. 
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an inefficient and costly adjudication process,23 which was finally resolved by 
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The Bankruptcy Code originally granted 
bankruptcy courts jurisdiction over all proceedings, whether arising under or 
related to the Code.24 There was, however, one shortcoming: the Bankruptcy 
Reform Act did not grant the newly created bankruptcy judges Article III 
status.25 This omission led to a major setback when the Supreme Court in 
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. held that non-
Article III judges could not rule upon state-created rights, effectively repealing 
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code’s extensive jurisdiction over bankruptcy 
proceedings.26 
Congress took action after the Marathon ruling to draft a new amendment 
protecting the Bankruptcy Code’s comprehensive jurisdiction over bankruptcy 
proceedings.27 One proposal was to give the bankruptcy judges Article III 
status, but the majority of legislators worried that this would violate the 
doctrine of federalism.28 Instead, Congress addressed the issue in the 1984 
Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code by granting bankruptcy courts “original 
and exclusive” jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases and original, but not 
exclusive, jurisdiction over civil cases arising under or related to the Code.29 
Essentially, this created a two-tier structure: for bankruptcy actions, 
bankruptcy courts may enter judgments arising under the Code, but for actions 
only related to the Code, “bankruptcy court[s] may make only proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, to be submitted to the district court for 
it to enter orders or judgments,” unless the parties consent otherwise.30 The 
former are known as “core” proceedings while the latter “noncore” 
 
 23 See Mette H. Kurth, Comment, An Unstoppable Mandate and an Immovable Policy: The Arbitration 
Act and the Bankruptcy Code Collide, 43 UCLA L. REV. 999, 1007 (1996) (“The distinction between summary 
and plenary proceedings was vague, and parties frequently litigated the issue. If the court determined that a 
proceeding was plenary, it would have to be heard by a district court. The resulting protracted litigation and 
bifurcated proceedings imposed costly delays on bankruptcy cases.”). 
 24 Bankruptcy Reform Act § 241(a), 92 Stat. at 2668–69, invalidated by N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. 
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982); Kurth, supra note 23, at 1007–08. 
 25 Birney, supra note 21, at 645 (“The 1978 Bankruptcy Act did not confer Article III status on the 
bankruptcy judges because they were not accorded life tenure.”). 
 26 Id. (citing Marathon Pipe Line, 458 U.S. at 87). 
 27 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1008. 
 28 Id. 
 29 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 101(a), 98 Stat. 
333, 333 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a)–(b) (2006)); Kurth, supra note 23, at 1008–09. 
 30 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 510; see also 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)–(c), invalidated as applied in Stern v. 
Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011). 
KUSHELEV GALLEYSFINAL 6/6/2012 11:45 AM 
2012] BREAKING THE CORE OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE 359 
proceedings.31 Because core proceedings have never been exclusively defined, 
bankruptcy courts have wide discretion in this determination, ultimately 
affecting which court has jurisdiction over the proceeding.32 
Due to the nature of recent transactional disputes, businesses are not only 
filing more frequently for arbitration, but also for bankruptcy,33 making the 
collision between arbitration agreements and the Bankruptcy Code recurrent 
and prominent. For instance, arbitration calls for the dispute to be settled by a 
separate tribunal whereas a bankruptcy proceeding demands that all of the 
debtor’s disputes be centralized.34 Because the Supreme Court has yet to 
consider the enforceability of arbitration agreements in bankruptcy 
proceedings, the circuit courts have been left to interpret this issue.35 While the 
circuit courts have applied some rules consistently, others are left purely to the 
court’s discretion, creating a split in interpretations.36 
This Note will focus on the enforceability of arbitration clauses in 
bankruptcy proceedings under the FAA, New York Convention, and chapter 
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, using international approaches as support. It will 
begin by identifying the current foundational analyses used in this 
controversial area and explaining why arbitration agreements should not 
always be enforced in core bankruptcy proceedings in Part I. Next, the Note 
will outline in Part II why the current regime is flawed and in need of an 
overhaul. Lastly, the Note will recommend in Part III a viable solution that is 
in the best interests of the parties, FAA, and Bankruptcy Code. 
 
 31 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (full nonexclusive list of core proceedings); Kirgis, supra note 10, at 510 
(“Section 157(b)(2) [. . .] gives a nonexclusive list of the matters considered core proceedings, including 
objections to a creditor’s proof of claim, preference actions, counterclaims against persons filing claims 
against the estate, and challenges to the automatic stay or to the discharge of debts. Matters that do not raise 
bankruptcy issues, such as breach of contract or fraud actions brought on behalf of the debtor by a [t]rustee 
against a third-party, are considered noncore proceedings.” (footnote omitted)). 
 32 See Matthew Dameron, Note, Stop the Stay: Interrupting Bankruptcy To Conduct Arbitration, 2001 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 337, 340 (“The effect of the core and non-core distinction in the arbitration context is that a 
bankruptcy judge has exclusive jurisdiction over the issue if it is a core proceeding.”). 
 33 See U.S. Bankruptcy Courts—Bankruptcy Cases Commenced, Terminated and Pending During the 12-
Month Periods Ending March 31, 2010 and 2011, U.S. COURTS, www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/Statistics/ 
BankruptcyStatistics/BankruptcyFilings/2011/0311_f.pdf (noting that bankruptcy filings have increased 
overall from March 2010 to March 2011 by 2.6%, from 1,531,997 to 1,571,183, and pending cases have 
increased by 3.7% during that same period, from 1,596,990 to 1,656,179). 
 34 See infra Part I.B.  
 35 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 517. 
 36 See id. at 517–18. 
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I. IF IT AIN’T BROKE, DON’T FIX IT: WHY CORE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS 
SHOULD NOT ALWAYS BE COMPELLED TO ARBITRATE 
A. Enforcing Arbitration in Bankruptcy Proceedings Today 
Bankruptcy law has two overarching goals: to provide a debtor with a 
“fresh start” and to provide creditors with “an equitable distribution of the 
debtor’s nonexempt assets.”37 Once a debtor files for bankruptcy, the court 
imposes an automatic stay to halt any other judicial proceedings against the 
debtor or the debtor’s property.38 The stay benefits debtors by giving them time 
to organize their finances and benefits creditors by protecting their interests in 
repayment.39 Both courts and legislative history have indicated that the 
automatic stay applies to arbitration proceedings, notwithstanding certain 
situations where the automatic stay may be lifted.40 Once the automatic stay is 
implemented, a creditor must file a proof of claim with the bankruptcy court to 
recover their losses.41 However, if a party wishes to continue with its claims 
against the debtor outside of bankruptcy, including any arbitrable claims the 
creditor may have, it must file a petition with the bankruptcy court to lift the 
stay.42 The court may lift the stay for cause,43 if the party requesting exclusion 
from the stay meets the required burden of proof and provides a cause.44 It is 
important to note that the automatic stay does not apply if the debtor is the 
plaintiff, which allows the parties to pursue arbitration.45 It is the determination 
of when an automatic stay should be lifted when the debtor is the defendant 
that is difficult. 
The courts have fashioned various methods for determining when a court 
should consider lifting the stay and allowing arbitration to be compelled, but 
 
 37 Id. at 505 (“Bankruptcy creates a process in which creditors as a group can receive the highest possible 
return, while ensuring that no creditor benefits unfairly at the expense of others.”). 
 38 11 U.S.C. § 362 (2006) (describing how the automatic stay functions); Kirgis, supra note 10, at 505 
(“The automatic stay forecloses any attempt to collect on a pre-petition debt, the pursuit of any lawsuit to 
collect a debt, the repossession of the debtor’s assets, as well as virtually any other action that would allow a 
creditor to improve its position with respect to other creditors.”). 
 39 Dameron, supra note 32, at 338. 
 40 Id. at 338–39 (“Some of the exceptions to the automatic stay include criminal proceedings, actions to 
establish paternity, and proceedings to modify or establish child support or maintenance.”). 
 41 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 505–06. 
 42 11 U.S.C. § 362(c)–(d); see also Dameron, supra note 32, at 339. 
 43 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(1). 
 44 Id. § 362(d)(1), (g). 
 45 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1015; see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (stopping only actions against the debtor, 
the “property of the debtor,” or the “property of the estate”). 
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there are two general methods that seem to take precedence. In the first, some 
courts consider the matter left entirely to the bankruptcy court’s “sound 
discretion,” leaving it to conduct a factor-based analysis appraising the 
competing interests of the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code.46 Many courts at 
present, however, use the second: determining initially whether the matter 
touches upon a core or noncore matter, and then appraising whether there is an 
inherent conflict between arbitration and the Bankruptcy Code.47 The rest of 
this section will focus on this second test. 
In McMahon, the Supreme Court took the pivotal step of providing a 
framework (the “McMahon test”) to determine when a claim arising under a 
federal statute is nonarbitrable.48 In the McMahon test, 
a party claiming that an agreement to arbitrate a statutory claim is not 
enforceable must prove [c]ongressional intent to make an exception 
to the FAA from either 1) the text of the statute, 2) the legislative 
history of the statute, or 3) an inherent conflict between arbitration 
and the purposes of the statute.49  
Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. was the first case to 
apply the McMahon test to determine the enforceability of an arbitration 
agreement in a noncore bankruptcy proceeding.50 The Third Circuit held that 
because bankruptcy courts do not have exclusive jurisdiction over noncore 
proceedings, there is no inherent conflict, and thus arbitration agreements are 
enforceable in noncore proceedings.51 Once a bankruptcy proceeding has been 
 
 46 See, e.g., Wm. S. Newman Brewing Co. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc. (In re Wm. S. Newman Brewing 
Co.), 87 B.R. 236, 241 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1988) (using factors related to the value of arbitration versus 
adjudication by a court of law); see also Kurth, supra note 23, at 1017–19 (listing cases leaving the issue to the 
“sound discretion” of the bankruptcy courts); infra Part II.A.2. 
 47 See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 10, at 517–20 (noting, and criticizing, the “current framework” of focusing 
on the core/noncore distinction and the use of the McMahon test). 
 48 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 518–19; see also Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 
226–27 (1987) (“The Arbitration Act, standing alone, therefore mandates enforcement of agreements to 
arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory directive, the Arbitration Act’s mandate may be overridden by a 
contrary congressional command. The burden is on the party opposing arbitration, however, to show that 
Congress intended to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue. If Congress did 
intend to limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular claim, such an intent ‘will be deducible 
from [the statute’s] text or legislative history,’ or from an inherent conflict between arbitration and the statute’s 
underlying purposes.” (citations omitted)). 
 49 Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 281. Most cases will be examined under the inherent/irreconcilable prong 
of the McMahon test. Id. at 281. 
 50 Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 1149, 1156 (3d Cir. 1989); 
Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 281. 
 51 See Hays & Co., 885 F.2d at 1157–58; see also Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 282. In any case, absent 
the consent of the parties, the determinations of the bankruptcy courts of noncore claims would need to be 
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determined as noncore, arbitration agreements are likely to be enforced, 
because the court will lift the automatic stay.52  
As for core bankruptcy proceedings, the McMahon test—and specifically 
its third prong requiring an inherent conflict to avoid enforcement—is the 
usual standard that courts use to determine the enforceability of arbitration 
clauses.53 Nevertheless, interpretations differ. “The Third and Fifth Circuits 
have held that a bankruptcy court has discretion to refuse to enforce an 
arbitration clause if the proceedings are based on the Bankruptcy Code 
provisions and arbitration would inherently conflict with the purposes of the 
Code.”54 The Second and Fourth Circuits have gone a step further and added 
that arbitration agreements are also unenforceable if they would “necessarily 
jeopardize the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code.”55 Many lower courts 
distinguish core cases based on whether the debtor or the trustee is pursuing or 
resisting the enforcement of the arbitration clause.56 Whatever the method, 
arbitration agreements face an uphill battle for enforcement if they touch upon 
a core matter.57 
B. Centralized Claims 
“The federal bankruptcy statutory scheme permits the modification of the 
rights of debtors and creditors, and one purpose of its structure is to centralize 
 
reviewed by the district courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(c) (2006). This is because “[n]oncore claims do not rest on 
substantive rights created by bankruptcy []law . . . . Accordingly, [bankruptcy judges] have no discretion to 
refuse to compel arbitration if a district court judge could not refuse to compel arbitration when hearing the 
same claims in a nonbankruptcy context.” Kirgis, supra note 10, at 517–18. 
 52 See Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 282 (“[V]irtually every circuit agrees with the underlying premise of 
Hays that once a proceeding is classified as non-core, the likelihood of avoiding enforcement of an arbitration 
agreement under the McMahon test significantly decreases.”). 
 53 See, e.g., Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 231 (3d Cir. 2006); Gandy 
v. Gandy (In re Gandy), 299 F.3d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 2002); see also Kirgis, supra note 10, at 519 (“Lower 
courts in bankruptcy cases have used the McMahon language to create a test for when a court has discretion to 
refuse to enforce an arbitration clause to a core claim in bankruptcy. They treat the question as one of a clash 
between the FAA and the Bankruptcy Code, and purport to determine whether Congress intended to preclude 
arbitration of core matters.”). 
 54 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 519. 
 55 See id. at 520 (quoting MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 108 (2d Cir. 2006)).  
 56 See Kurth, supra note 23, at 1023 & n.167.  
 57 See, e.g., Kirgis, supra note 10, at 520 (“[I]f so inclined, [judges in bankruptcy] seem to have fairly 
broad power to refuse to enforce arbitration, at least of core claims.”); Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 283 
(“District courts in the Fourth Circuit agree that the likelihood of an inherent conflict between the purposes of 
the Amended Bankruptcy Code and the FAA are greater when the dispute involves an agreement to arbitrate a 
core proceeding.”). 
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disputes regarding a debtor’s assets and liabilities in the bankruptcy courts.”58 
The bankruptcy system benefits from this single forum because it produces 
uniform results stemming from Congress’s intention that bankruptcy judges 
have both subject matter and in personam jurisdiction to preside over 
bankruptcy cases.59 The automatic stay supports this single-forum procedure 
by limiting the ability of parties to litigate outside of the bankruptcy 
proceedings unless they meet the obligations under § 362(d) to lift the stay.60 
1. Protecting Creditors 
Centralized claims are extremely important in bankruptcy proceedings 
because they enable creditors to receive equitable distribution for their 
claims.61 This distribution policy acts as an underlying guarantee to parties 
entering into business agreements that they will have a claim for recovery in 
case of a bankruptcy filing. Otherwise, “[i]n a world of individual actions, each 
creditor knows that if he waits too long, the debtor’s assets will have been 
exhausted by the demands of the quicker creditors and he will recover 
nothing.”62 Additionally, creditors only need to file a proof of claim and can 
thereby estimate their chances of recovery depending on the claim’s secured or 
unsecured status;63 they can then incorporate their likelihood of recovering into 
their future business plans to ensure their own success and survival. 
Centralized control over all claims also reveals any counterfeit claims against 
 
 58 Birney, supra note 21, at 657 (citation omitted). 
 59 Alan N. Resnick, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in Bankruptcy, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 183, 183–84 (2007). Indeed, “one of the core features of the bankruptcy reforms was to allow the 
bankruptcy court to centralize all disputes concerning property of the debtor’s estate so that reorganization can 
proceed efficiently, unimpeded by uncoordinated proceedings in other arenas.” Id. at 184 (quoting U.S. Lines, 
Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 640 (2d Cir. 1999)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 60 See Birney, supra note 21, at 667–68 (“The collective proceeding is best exemplified by the two-fold 
purpose of the automatic stay provisions of [§] 362 of the Bankruptcy Code: (1) to give the debtor a ‘breathing 
spell’ from collection efforts and permit a repayment or reorganization plan; and, (2) to provide creditors 
protection against other creditors’ actions or collection attempts.”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (2006) (listing 
grounds on which a court can lift a stay). 
 61 See Birney, supra note 21, at 666–67. 
 62 Sherwood Partners, Inc. v. Lycos, Inc., 394 F.3d 1198, 1203 (9th Cir. 2005), quoted in Birney, supra 
note 21, at 667. 
 63 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 506 (“Creditors filing proofs of claim are then sorted into different 
classes, depending on their interests and the nature of the debts. Secured creditors are in the best position, 
because they are entitled to value of their collateral. Unsecured creditors are placed in a priority structure in 
which certain types of claims are given a preference over others. Priority claims, such as marital support 
obligations, taxes, and employee wage claims, are paid in full before lower categories of claims are paid at all. 
General unsecured creditors are paid last, receiving pro rata share of whatever is left after claims with higher 
priority are paid.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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the debtor’s estate.64 For these reasons, it is crucial that the estate is protected 
and managed to maximize its value for the repayment of creditors.65 
To protect the potential vulnerability of creditors in bankruptcy 
proceedings, Congress enacted various levels of protection within the Code.66 
However, this protection scheme in chapter 11 reorganizations comes into 
conflict with the FAA, which was originally intended to address “simple 
questions of law, not statutory or constitutional issues,” but has since grown to 
apply broadly in both federal and state courts.67 It is therefore difficult to 
reconcile the objectives of the two regimes and their diverging practices. 
These differing objectives of bankruptcy and arbitration at times lead the 
methods of enforcement in one to be at odds with those in the other. First, the 
Bankruptcy Code permits nonparties, such as the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, the creditors’ committee, or any creditor, to appear in a 
bankruptcy proceeding and raise any issues that party may have.68 The 
reasoning for this stems from the fact that, “[i]n litigation, anyone with a 
sufficient interest to protect may bring suit, and there are many mechanisms for 
interested third parties, those who might be adversely affected by the court’s 
decision, to intervene or be joined.”69 However, arbitration is an exclusive 
process that only allows signatories to the agreement to participate in the 
proceedings, and because the hearings are private, outside parties will have 
little information as to how or why the award was reached.70 Nonparty 
creditors who have an interest in the claim are unable to participate and protect 
their rights during these private arbitration proceedings, while they would be 
able to do so in centralized bankruptcy proceedings.71 Forcing these excluded 
nonparty creditors to accept the results of the arbitration “diminish[es] their 
 
 64 See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Coming Encounter: International Arbitration and Bankruptcy, 67 
MINN. L. REV. 595, 606 (1983). 
 65 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 506. (“The estate can include almost any type of asset, and these assets 
must be managed so that they produce the greatest possible return to the creditors.”). For instance, in a chapter 
11 bankruptcy, “the debtor retains its assets and continues to function, paying off the debts over time to the 
greatest extent feasible.” Id. 
 66 See Note, Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy Proceedings: A Test Case for Implied Repeal of the Federal 
Arbitration Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2296, 2307 (2004). 
 67 Birney, supra note 21, at 632–35 (quoting Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the 
Supreme Court Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99, 
112 (2006)). 
 68 11 U.S.C. § 1109 (2006). 
 69 Marianne B. Culhane, Limiting Litigation over Arbitration in Bankruptcy, 17 AM. BANKR. INST. L. 
REV. 493, 495–96 (2009). This allows the interests of multiple parties to be addressed. Id. 
 70 See id. at 496. 
 71 See id. 
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baseline procedural rights under the FAA”72 and raises additional due process 
concerns.73 Therefore, the scope of consent to enter arbitration may need to be 
extended to these nonparties as well or they should not be bound by the 
arbitration award.74 
Second, bankruptcy affords protection to creditors without requiring any 
affirmative action on their behalf, and “the bankruptcy judge has certain 
obligations that may not be waived, even by unanimous party agreement.”75 
On the other hand, arbitration is a contractual agreement, which allows the 
parties to structure the arbitration to their liking;76 this allows the parties, if 
they wish, to waive certain procedural protections.77 In addition, bankruptcy 
judges are highly specialized and are trained to balance the rights of creditors 
and debtors in complex bankruptcy claims.78 However, arbitrators may be less 
familiar with the relevant law and may possibly be biased towards certain 
creditors.79 The combination of untrained and partial arbitrators coupled with 
the lack of adequate protections can produce results that are inconsistent and 
even contrary to identical cases decided by bankruptcy judges.80 Hence, 
“arbitration deprives creditors of the protections afforded by a neutral judicial 
officer[] and leads to a systematic bias in favor of the creditor who is able to 
remove himself from the adjudicatory scheme.”81 
 
 72 Note, supra note 66, at 2309.  
 73 See id. (“Thus, the due process concerns that mandate consent by the parties have just as much force 
with respect to these nonparties.”). 
 74 Id. (“[A]lthough the FAA requires consent to be bound by an arbitration award, the Code has modified 
this background law by creating a system that will bind creditors through determinations of others’ rights 
regardless of nonparty status; this modification suggests the need to depart from a formalistically narrow 
definition of whose consent is required for arbitration.”). 
 75 See id. at 2307 & n.71 (“For example, the bankruptcy judge must ensure that the filing is made in good 
faith and must execute this responsibility even if all parties have unanimously agreed to the good faith of the 
filing. Similarly, the judge must reject party attempts to contract for certain outcomes in bankruptcy; for 
example, since the Code is intended to protect the creditors and thus cannot be waived by debtors, pre-filing 
waivers of the automatic stay are invalid.” (citation omitted)). 
 76 See 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 82–83. 
 77 See, e.g., id. at 83–84 (“More generally, parties are typically free to agree upon the existence and scope 
of discovery or disclosure, the modes for presentation of fact and expert evidence, the length of the hearing, 
the timetable and other matters.”). 
 78 See Culhane, supra note 69, at 496 (“Arbitration substitutes arbitrators, who are less skilled in the 
relevant law and possibly inclined to favor particular creditors, for experienced and expert bankruptcy 
judges.”). 
 79 See id. 
 80 See Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 169 (4th Cir. 
2005). 
 81 Note, supra note 66, at 2308. 
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Third, trustees in bankruptcy proceedings protect creditors by maximizing 
the value of the estate and to this end are endowed with certain powers, such as 
pursuing any claims against third parties.82 In contrast, allowing arbitration to 
proceed may actually harm the value of the estate for the other creditors who 
are not parties to the arbitration agreement.83 Creditors can willingly choose to 
omit arbitration clauses in their credit agreements, preferring other methods of 
dispute resolution, and yet their recovery may still be jeopardized by an arbitral 
award.84 To illustrate this risk, assume the following scenario: Creditor 1 is 
allowed to compel arbitration, wins, and then has the tribunal determine the 
value of his award.85 Creditor 2, who did not enter into arbitration, will have 
his recovery affected by Creditor 1’s award because “[t]he estate 
is . . . distributed pro rata among the creditors; thus, the larger [Creditor 1’s] 
recovery, the smaller the recovery of [Creditor 2].”86 The situation for Creditor 
2 can get even worse if he is a general unsecured creditor. Based on the 
priority system of distribution in bankruptcy, if Creditor 1 is a priority creditor, 
he will recover the full amount of the arbitral award before Creditor 2 can 
recover anything, potentially leaving Creditor 2 with nothing.87  
While public policy favors centralization in bankruptcy proceedings,88 
some courts have noted that this is still not enough for them to avoid the 
enforcement of arbitration agreements: 
The policies of centralized resolution of claims and a generalized 
prohibition against piecemeal litigation are present in any core 
bankruptcy proceeding, and . . . these weaker policies underlying the 
Bankruptcy Code must yield to the stronger federal policy favoring 
the enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.89 
Current trends in the decisions of the Supreme Court and the mandates found 
in the FAA strongly support the enforcement of arbitration agreements in all 
 
 82 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 507. “The Code itself also confers power on [t]rustees and DIPs to pursue 
claims designed to protect the corpus of the bankruptcy estate.” Id. This includes the “power to avoid 
preferential transfers and the power to avoid fraudulent conveyances.” Id. 
 83 See Note, supra note 66, at 2307. 
 84 Id. 
 85 See id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Id. 
 88 Michael D. Fielding, Elevating Business Above the Constitution: Arbitration and Bankruptcy Proofs of 
Claims, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 563, 600 (2008). 
 89 In re Farmland Indus., Inc., 309 B.R. 14, 21 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2004), quoted in Fielding, supra note 
88, at 600 (alteration in original). 
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scenarios.90 In fact, even arguments refusing to compel arbitration when 
specialized knowledge is not required or all creditors could not participate have 
been uniformly rejected in favor of arbitration.91 
2. Promotes Efficiency and Lower Costs 
Congress’s intent in drafting the Bankruptcy Code was to ensure an 
efficient and speedy system because “delay only operates to devalue assets, 
hinder financial rehabilitation, and prevent [the] exercise of rights.”92 In fact, 
“[t]he efficiency of the mechanisms for resolving distress can be measured by 
the loss in asset value incurred in the process of the asset and debt 
restructuring.”93 It can be difficult for a struggling debtor to reach a settlement 
to appease each creditor in a private restructuring because there are many 
creditors with divergent interests94 or to avoid the effects of “piecemeal 
litigation” such as arbitration.95 Bankruptcy law circumvents the inefficiencies 
of piecemeal litigation “so that reorganization can proceed efficiently, 
unimpeded by uncoordinated proceedings in other arenas.”96 
Parties who want to compel arbitration in bankruptcy proceedings do so 
because they believe it lowers unnecessary costs and delay.97 However, this 
 
 90 See Neufeld, supra note 14, at 526–27, 532–39; see also AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. 
Ct. 1740, 1748–53 (2011) (preempting California rule prohibiting waiver of class arbitration in contracts of 
adhesion). 
 91 Neufeld, supra note 14, at 557 (“Many of the arguments against arbitration relied upon by the 
bankruptcy courts have been rejected by the Supreme Court, albeit not in bankruptcy cases. Those rejected 
arguments include: that federal statutory rights are not amenable to resolution in arbitration; that arbitration 
agreements may be ignored when they cause additional cause and delay; that arbitration is enforced only when 
an arbitrator’s specialized knowledge is required; that whenever arbitrable claims are intertwined with 
nonarbitrable claims the judicial forum wins out; and that the existence of parties to the underlying dispute 
who are not parties to the arbitration agreement means that the judicial forum is preferable.”). 
 92 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 13 (1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 5975. 
 93 Edith S. Hotchkiss et al., Bankruptcy and the Resolution of Financial Distress, in 2 HANDBOOK OF 
CORPORATE FINANCE: EMPIRICAL CORPORATE FINANCE 235, 239 (B. Espen Eckbo ed., 2008) (“A number of 
factors related to the structure of the firm’s claims and to the institutional framework governing the process for 
restructuring contribute to these costs.”). 
 94 See id. at 243 (“Impediments to reaching a settlement in a private restructuring include information 
asymmetries that arise between poorly informed outside creditors and better informed managers or insiders of 
the firm; holdout problems when the firm’s debt is held by a large number of diffuse creditors; and various 
conflicts of interest exacerbated when a firm has multiple layers of creditors.”). 
 95 See Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 170 (4th Cir. 
2005), cited in Birney, supra note 21, at 663. 
 96 Id. at 170 (quoting Shugrue v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l (In re Ionosphere Clubs, Inc.), 922 F.2d 984, 
989 (2d Cir. 1990)), cited in Birney, supra note 21, at 663. 
 97 See 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 84 (“It has long been said that arbitration offers a cheaper, quicker means 
of dispute resolution than national court proceedings.”). 
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may not always be the case, and international arbitrations are especially 
worrisome because they have the potential to be more expensive than judicial 
forums and persist for years.98 Furthermore, “litigating disputes over the 
enforceability of arbitration clauses deprives parties of the primary benefits of 
arbitration: efficiency, speed, and avoidance of costs associated with litigation 
in the court system.”99 A debtor who is opposed to a creditor’s request to 
compel arbitration may spend time and money fighting the motion, which 
delays both the recovery of other creditors and prevents the debtor from 
reorganizing.100 This process can also greatly reduce the value of the debtor’s 
estate.101 
The bankruptcy process is already longer than most other forms of federal 
litigation because there is an additional level of review—after a determination 
in the bankruptcy court, a decision can be appealed to a district court or 
bankruptcy appellate panel, and then further to the circuit court of appeals.102 
Appealing a decision to compel arbitration creates yet another layer of review, 
which again delays all other proceedings.103 The creation of additional 
litigation and needless review when courts are required to make decisions on a 
case-by-case basis leads to results unpredictable and inconsistent in their 
outcomes and therefore runs contrary to the principles of efficiency in both the 
FAA and Bankruptcy Code.104 Because the Code already promotes efficiency 
and cost savings,105 these factors alone are not sufficient to compel arbitration 
for core proceedings.106 
 
 98 Jay Lawrence Westbrook, International Arbitration and Multinational Insolvency, 29 PENN ST. INT’L 
L. REV. 635, 641 (2011). In international disputes, parties prefer court proceedings as they may be in fact more 
efficient and less costly. Id. 
 99 Resnick, supra note 59, at 212. 
 100 Id. “Money spent on tangential dispute resolution is money not available to creditors. Time spent that 
delays the resolution of the bankruptcy is time in which the debtor cannot move forward . . . .” Kirgis, supra 
note 10, at 528. 
 101 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 528. 
 102 Resnick, supra note 59, at 212 (“In [most] core proceedings, . . . parties may appeal to the district court 
or, if available in the particular jurisdiction, the bankruptcy appellate panel, and then to the court of appeals. In 
non-core proceedings, unless all parties consent to determination by the bankruptcy court, the bankruptcy 
judge issues proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law that may be reviewed de novo by the district 
court, whose decision may be appealed to the court of appeals.” (footnote omitted)). 
 103 See id. at 213 (“Moreover, the Arbitration Act provides that a court order refusing a stay in 
proceedings in which an issue is referable to arbitration may be appealed as of right.”). 
 104 See id. 
 105 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (2006) (preventing a multitude of competing plans for the first 120 days 
by giving the debtor an exclusive right to file a plan during this period); id. § 1122(a) (allowing the plan 
proponent flexibility in classifying the treatment a plan gives to claim or interest holders by only requiring that 
the class of claims or interests be “substantially similar” to one another); id. § 1122(b) (allowing plan 
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In spite of all this, “a refusal to allow any arbitration for fear of 
fractionalized litigation could impede efficiency goals by congesting the 
bankruptcy courts with needless litigation.”107 Moreover, under current case 
law, courts have discretion not to compel arbitration if a party would not be 
able to effectively pursue its legal rights, such as when the costs of arbitration 
may be too high, as considered in Green Tree Financial Corp.–Alabama v. 
Randolph.108 The Fourth Circuit formally adopted a test to determine whether 
high arbitration costs would impede a claimant’s right of action in Bradford v. 
Rockwell Semiconductor Systems., Inc.109 Essentially, the Bradford test 
compares the costs incurred in arbitration to those in litigation for the specific 
case and weighs the party’s ability to pay.110 Applying this test to a bankruptcy 
proceeding, if the costs of arbitration outweigh those incurred in a centralized 
bankruptcy proceeding, then the arbitration agreement should likely not be 
enforced.  
One approach in reviewing costs that would not compromise any rights 
under the Bankruptcy Code would involve shifting the burden of proof to the 
party seeking arbitration to show that the costs of arbitrating would be 
reasonable.111 Debtors or trustees should then be allowed to challenge this cost 
analysis.112 If the third party cannot meet this burden or if the trustees succeed 
in their challenge, then arbitration could be reasonably denied from the 
 
proponent to classify smaller claims together “as reasonable and necessary for administrative convenience”); 
id. § 1127(d) (not requiring a claim or interest holder to revote their treatment each time a plan is modified by 
the plan proponent). 
 106 Cf. Kurth, supra note 23, at 1029–30 (“When parties include arbitration agreements in a contract, they 
are usually assuming that arbitration is more expedient than litigation. In bankruptcy courts, however, the 
procedures are already streamlined to achieve swift, expedient results. Thus, arbitration is not necessarily more 
expedient than resolution in the bankruptcy forum.” (footnote omitted)). 
 107 Id. at 1030. 
 108 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 526; see also Green Tree Fin. Corp.–Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90 (2000) 
(“It may well be that the existence of large arbitration costs could preclude a litigant such as Randolph from 
effectively vindicating her federal statutory rights in the arbitral forum.”). 
 109 Bradford v. Rockwell Semiconductor Sys., Inc., 238 F.3d 549, 556 (4th Cir. 2001); Kirgis, supra note 
10, at 526. 
 110 Bradford, 238 F.3d at 556; see also Kirgis, supra note 10, at 527. “In analyzing this issue, reviewing 
courts should consider the costs of litigation as the alternative to arbitration, as in Bradford, but they must 
weigh the potential costs of litigation in a realistic manner.” Morrison v. Circuit City Stores, Inc., 317 F.3d 
646, 664 (6th Cir. 2003) (en banc). 
 111 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 528–29. This is contrary to the original Bradford test, which held the 
burden to be on the party seeking to avoid the enforcement of the arbitration agreement. See Bradford, 238 
F.3d at 557. 
 112 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 530.  
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beginning without allowing further appeals. Protecting the estate justifies 
changing the burden of proof. 
C. Arbitration Agreements Are Executory Contracts 
Defined by common law, an executory contract is “a contract in which at 
least one party has not yet fully performed.”113 There is no universally 
accepted definition for executory contracts in bankruptcy law.114 Instead, most 
courts have adopted the following definition proposed by Professor Vern 
Countryman: “a contract under which the obligation of both the bankrupt and 
the other party to the contract are so far unperformed that the failure of either 
to complete performance would constitute a material breach excusing the 
performance of the other.”115 Nonexecutory contracts may neither be assumed 
nor rejected and endure during the bankruptcy proceeding.116 
On the other hand, the trustee is allowed to assume or reject any executory 
contract with the court’s permission under § 365.117 Rejecting an executory 
contract is appropriate if it leads to “(1) enlarging the value of property of the 
estate, (2) furthering the rehabilitation of the debtor, and (3) 
protect[ing] . . . creditors.”118 These three examples are again a reflection of the 
policies underlying centralized claims, i.e., the protection of creditors and the 
 
 113 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1012.  
 114 Id. (“Most states define an executory contract as a contract in which at least one party has not yet fully 
performed. It is generally agreed that the bankruptcy law does not incorporate this common state-law 
definition, but the bankruptcy courts have not yet come to a consensus over the proper definition of an 
executory contract.”). 
 115 Vern Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REV. 439, 460 (1973), 
quoted in part in Kurth, supra note 23, at 1012.  
 116 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1012 (“Examples of nonexecutory contracts include contracts that have fully 
terminated before the bankruptcy petition, contracts that create security interests, and financing leases that are 
deemed secured transactions.”). Additionally, in Hays, the appellate court noted that district courts did not 
have discretion to refuse enforcement of arbitration clauses when nonexecutory contracts are binding on the 
trustee or DIP. See id. at 1022 (citing Hays & Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 885 F.2d 
1149, 1153, 1155–56 (3d Cir. 1989)). 
 117 11 U.S.C. § 365(a) (2006). Kurth outlines many of the practical consequences of assuming or rejecting 
an executory contract: 
When a contract is assumed, it becomes binding on the bankruptcy estate. If the trustee breaches a 
contract after assuming it, the injured party can assert a damage claim that will be entitled to 
priority as a postpetition administrative expense. Rejection of a contract, however, constitutes a 
breach of contract relating back to the date that the bankruptcy petition was filed. This leaves the 
injured party with a prepetition damage claim rather than an administrative claim.  
Kurth, supra note 23, at 1013 (footnotes omitted). 
 118 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1013 (citing In re Booth, 19 B.R. 53, 57–61 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982)).  
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value of the estate. Section 502 further protects creditors by not providing 
preferential treatment for a creditor whose contract has not been assumed and 
is breached postpetition.119 This is done by including any unsecured contract, 
whether breached prepetition or postpetition, with the claims of other general 
unsecured creditors, which entitles the creditor to a pro rata distribution of the 
estate.120 If this rule was not in place, “any contract breached pre-petition 
would be treated as an administrative expense entitled to § 507(a)[(2)] priority; 
the creditor would receive the full value of his claim before any payment could 
be made to the general unsecured creditors.”121 This limits the incentive for a 
debtor to breach its contracts prepetition for preferred creditors.122  
As for arbitration agreements, the principle of separability “establishes the 
arbitration as a severable contract whose rejection is independent of the 
container contract; the executory nature of the contracts are determined 
separately, and the trustee may reject one, both, or neither of the contracts.”123 
Because of this doctrine, arbitration agreements must first be deemed as stand-
alone executory contracts under Countryman’s definition124 for the trustee to 
be able to reject them.125 Analyzing arbitration agreements show that they 
readily fit this definition of executory contracts. First, there is an unperformed 
obligation because the parties have not yet arbitrated and resolved their 
disputes at the time a bankruptcy is filed because of the automatic stay.126 
Second, failing to arbitrate constitutes a material breach under section 2 of the 
FAA, which mandates that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, 
and enforceable,”127 and therefore if arbitration does not take place, it is a 
breach of the agreement.128  
Under the executory analysis, the trustee may choose to assume arbitration 
agreements if they create value for the estate, a core tenet of bankruptcy.129 
However, if the trustee chooses to reject the arbitration agreement as an 
executory contract in accordance with the requirements of § 365, the 
 
 119 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(g). 
 120 Note, supra note 66, at 2313 n.89.  
 121 Id. (discussing 11 U.S.C § 507(a)(1) (2000), which granted priority claims for administrative expenses 
under § 503(b) and whose present form is codified at § 507(a)(2)); see also 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (2006). 
 122 See Note, supra note 66, at 2313 n.89.  
 123 Id. at 2314. 
 124 Countryman, supra note 115, at 460.  
 125 See Note, supra note 66, at 2314–15. 
 126 See id. at 2315.  
 127 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006). 
 128 See Note, supra note 66, at 2315–16.  
 129 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 509.  
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bankruptcy court should refuse to compel arbitration.130 The creditor would 
still then benefit from the protections granted under § 502 in their recovery.131 
This approach mirrors the courts’ desire to shift discretion to the trustee in 
arbitrability determinations and away from the judicial system.132 
Some scholars take this a step further and suggest that a trustee should have 
the option to assume or reject any contract, regardless of its executory status.133 
This is similar to the current law in the United Kingdom under the Insolvency 
Act of 1986. Section 349A(2) provides, “If the trustee in bankruptcy adopts the 
contract, the arbitration agreement is enforceable by or against the trustee in 
relation to matters arising from or connected with the contract.”134 Otherwise, 
the trustee can refuse to adopt the contract with the included arbitration 
agreement, and a court will only review whether there is a matter that should 
be referred to arbitration if an allowed party petitions the court.135  
Furthermore, this argument is supported by bankruptcy’s power to alter, 
impair, or modify contractual obligations as noted by the Supreme Court in the 
pre-Code case, Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement District 
Number One.136 Because arbitration clauses are just like any other privately 
 
 130 See Note, supra note 66, at 2316–17. 
 131 See 11 U.S.C. § 502(b), (g)(1) (allowing a claim that is rejected under § 365 to be treated as an allowed 
or disallowed claim “as if such claim had arisen before the date of the filing of the petition” and limiting the 
bases on which a court can reject the claim); see also Kirgis, supra note 10, at 509 (“If [an executory contract] 
is rejected, then the other party to the contract is entitled to damages, to be paid out of the estate upon 
distribution on the same basis as any other unsecured claim.”). 
 132 Note, supra note 66, at 2316–17.  
 133 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1013 (“Professors Andrew and Westbrook have developed a more theoretical 
approach. They suggest that executoriness does not matter at all. Instead, they argue that, subject to court 
approval, the trustee may assume or reject any contract, whether executory or not. The trustee decides whether 
the estate benefits more from performance or breach. Under this approach, assumption is equivalent to 
performing the contract, and rejection is equivalent to a breach of contract with a subsequent obligation to pay 
damages.” (citing Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts Revisited: A Reply to Professor Westbrook, 62 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1 (1991); Michael T. Andrew, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Understanding “Rejection,” 
59 U. COLO. L. REV. 845 (1988); Jay Lawrence Westbrook, A Functional Analysis of Executory Contracts, 74 
MINN. L. REV. 227, 231, 250–51 (1989))). 
 134 Insolvency Act, 1986, c. 45, § 349A(2) (U.K.), as amended by Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 46, sch. 
3 (U.K.). 
 135 Id. § 349A(3) (“If the trustee in bankruptcy does not adopt the contract and a matter to which the 
arbitration agreement applies requires to be determined in connection with or for the purposes of the 
bankruptcy proceedings—(a) the trustee with the consent of the creditors’ committee, or (b) any other party to 
the agreement, may apply to the court which may, if it thinks fit in all the circumstances of the case, order that 
the matter be referred to arbitration in accordance with the arbitration agreement.”). 
 136 Ashton v. Cameron Cnty. Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 530 (1936); Birney, supra 
note 21, at 658; see also Sec. Pac. Fin. Corp. v. Barto (In re Barto), 8 B.R. 145, 149 (1981) (“It is the especial 
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agreed-upon contractual term, “the power of bankruptcy courts to interfere 
with the contractual relations between the parties and to change, modify[,] or 
impair contractual obligations of their contracts apply equally to arbitration 
clauses.”137 Section 365 therefore properly allows trustees to modify and 
impair creditors’ contractual obligations by rejecting arbitration agreements. 
D. Choice of Law and Enforceability 
Arbitration is specifically attractive to parties in international business 
transactions due to the “pro-enforcement regime” behind it.138 The New York 
Convention is one of the key laws governing international arbitration;139 thus 
far, there are 146 contracting countries.140 The Convention’s basic tenets are 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by participating 
states.141 These two principles infuse arbitration proceedings with 
predictability that any awards rendered shall be enforceable. Without the 
presence of such an international doctrine, recognition of foreign awards would 
be endangered if subject to the local laws of each jurisdiction.142 While the 
treaty does supplant local law in recognition and enforceability, it does not 
solve all issues in attempting to enforce an international arbitration award. In 
 
purpose of all bankruptcy legislation to interfere with the relationship between the parties concerned—to 
change, modify, or impair the obligation of their contracts.” (citing Ashton, 298 U.S. 513)). 
 137 Birney, supra note 21, at 658. The Bankruptcy Code and surrounding case law demonstrate that 
Congress has the authority to modify contractual agreements, as seen from:  
(1) congressional intent to temporarily or permanently enjoin a party’s right to enforce its 
contractual rights and security interests; (2) the reshuffling of creditors’ believed priorities and 
the consequential fair and equitable distribution of a debtor’s property to those creditors; (3) the 
potential subordination of a party’s claim against a debtor; (4) the assumption or rejection of a 
party’s executory contract; (5) the negation of ipso facto clauses; and (6) the impairment or, in 
some instances, the outright stripping of a lien holder’s security interest in the debtor’s property 
interest. 
Id. at 659–60 (footnotes omitted). 
 138 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 76–78. 
 139 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 
U.N.T.S. 3, available at http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/UNTS/Volume%20330/v330.pdf; see also The 
New York Convention, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org (last 
visited Mar. 26, 2012) (noting the Convention is applicable to “the recognition and enforcement of foreign 
arbitral awards and the referral by a court to arbitration” (emphasis omitted)). 
 140 Contracting States, NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/new-
york-convention-countries (last visited Mar. 26, 2012). 
 141 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 139, art. I., 
¶ 1. 
 142 See 1 BORN, supra note 1, at 78. Such a system provides for more efficient and binding resolution to 
parties’ disputes. See id.  
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many countries, bankruptcy proceedings still “override most other laws and 
sweep[] into its embrace virtually all legal matters related to the debtor,” 
creating substantial tension between the policies favoring the reordering of the 
debtor’s affairs and the policies favoring the enforcement of arbitration 
awards.143 Choice of law conflicts are one such issue created by this tension.  
A few of the choice of law issues that arise when arbitration meets 
bankruptcy are “the applicable insolvency law, the law applicable to halting 
the arbitration, and the law governing the ultimate enforceability of the 
arbitration agreement or award, in the insolvency court or elsewhere.”144 An 
analysis of two cases involving the Polish company Elektrim S.A. illustrates 
these choice of law problems. Elektrim S.A. entered into an investment 
contract with Vivendi Universal S.A. governed by Polish law, which required 
that arbitration take place in London under English law.145 Vivendi filed for 
arbitration against Elektrim in 2003 for breach of contract.146 In 2007, a Polish 
bankruptcy court declared Elektrim bankrupt, and “Polish bankruptcy law 
provides that any arbitration clause entered into by the bankrupt company loses 
its legal effect when bankruptcy is declared, and any pending arbitration 
proceedings are discontinued.”147 Vivendi argued that English law governed 
the status of the arbitration, which would allow the proceedings to continue.148 
The London arbitral tribunal decided it had jurisdiction to hear the case and 
ruled in favor of Vivendi, and Elektrim sought to have the award set aside.149 
In that action, the English court had to decide whether local law (English law) 
or the law of the insolvency court (Polish law) governed the 
continuance/halting of the arbitration.150 Here, the English court determined 
that the EU Regulation left the consideration of whether to halt the arbitration 
to the local, in this case English, law.151 For the last issue of which law to 
apply for the enforceability of the arbitration agreement, the court applied local 
 
 143 Westbrook, supra note 98, at 635. Noting this issue, Professor Westbrook has stated: “[This] collision 
between an increasing number of multinational arbitrations and an increasing number of multinational 
insolvencies constitutes the irresistible force meeting the immoveable object.” Id. 
 144 Id. at 643. 
 145 English Justice Refuses to Set Aside Award Against Bankrupt Company, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., 
Oct. 2008, at 7, 7; see also Syska v. Vivendi Universal S.A., [2008] EWHC 2155 (Comm) 677, [1]–[2] (Eng.), 
aff’d, [2009] EWCA Civ 677.  
 146 Id. (noting that the breach of contract claim was premised on Elektrim’s purported interference or 
failure to acquire an interest for Vivendi in PTC, a Polish mobile telephone company). 
 147 Id. 
 148 See Westbrook, supra note 98, at 637. 
 149 English Justice Refuses, supra note 145, at 7. 
 150 Westbrook, supra note 98, at 644. 
 151 Id. at 644–45. 
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law, “even though the court recognized that the Polish proceeding was the 
‘main’ proceeding under the EU Regulation and that Polish law would hold the 
arbitration clause extinguished by the insolvency.”152 Notwithstanding the 
unenforceability of the arbitration clause if the matter had originally been 
determined under Polish law, the Warsaw Court of Appeals upheld Vivendi’s 
award during a subsequent enforcement action in Poland.153  
In contrast, Elektrim’s second arbitration, which took place in Switzerland, 
resulted in an opposite ruling.154 The Swiss Supreme Court dismissed the 
arbitration because “[w]hile the Polish insolvency rules did not operate directly 
in Switzerland, under Swiss conflicts principles, the law of the insolvency 
jurisdiction should control, and thus, the arbitration should be halted as against 
the insolvent debtor.”155 These two cases highlight how choosing the 
governing law in international disputes affected by bankruptcy not only affects 
whether arbitration will be permitted to proceed; more importantly, whether 
the award rendered will then be “conclusive and enforceable.”156 “[A] 
jurisdiction’s choice of law decision about arbitration should be closely linked 
to its policy on recognition and cooperation in insolvency matters.”157 If the 
policies of that jurisdiction reflect a “modified universalism” approach towards 
bankruptcy—that is, a dedication to coordinating insolvencies across 
jurisdictional lines to the greatest degree possible158—this will increase the 
likelihood of enforceable awards, especially when the debtor does not have 
property in the jurisdiction.159 For this reason, a bankruptcy court in the United 
States needs to take care in compelling arbitration under the current framework 
in order to ensure any award rendered will be enforceable domestically under 
the FAA or internationally under the New York Convention. It is imprudent to 
switch to a framework that compels arbitration in all bankruptcy proceedings; 
for instance, if a party tries to enforce the award in a foreign jurisdiction with 
 
 152 See id. at 637. 
 153 Ania Farren & Sara Nadeau-Seguin, Enforcement of the LCIA Award in Elektrim v Vivendi, PLC 
ARBITRATION, http://arbitration.practicallaw.com/9-381-7476 (last visited Mar. 25, 2012). 
 154 See id. at 637–38; see also Vivendi S.A. v. Deutsche Telekom AG, Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal 
Supreme Court] Mar. 31, 2009, 28 ASA BULL. 104 (Switz.).  
 155 See Westbrook, supra note 98, at 637–38. 
 156 Id. at 638. 
 157 Id. at 648. 
 158 Id. at 643. 
 159 See id. at 648 (“If a local court permits arbitration to go forward to an award and enforces that award 
against local assets, then it has moved away from an international system back to the traditional territorial 
regime in insolvency matters. If it refuses to enforce against local assets and sends the arbitration award 
claimant to the insolvency court, and that court refuses to accept the award as conclusive, the arbitration will 
have cost everyone concerned much time and money for nothing.”).  
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more restrictive conditions for enforcing arbitral awards in bankruptcy, that 
jurisdiction could vacate the award under Articles V(2)(a) or Article V(2)(b) of 
the New York Convention.160 Such an arbitration would therefore have been a 
waste of time and money for all parties.161 
To avoid such adverse results, the current application of the core/noncore 
distinction and the McMahon test should be continued. This approach mirrors 
how other countries treat the conflict. For example, Lebanon reviews an 
arbitration agreement made before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing: “such [an] 
agreement cannot be applied if it ensues from disputes related to or arising out 
of the bankruptcy or from disputes that would not have arisen except by cause 
of bankruptcy, or from disputes on which the bankruptcy has a legal effect.”162 
Additionally, under the Italian Bankruptcy Act, the insolvency court must hear 
all actions that specifically “originate from the extraordinary administration [of 
the bankruptcy]”; however, other bodies, including arbitrators, can hear actions 
that “have a merely occasional relationship” with the insolvency.163 
Considering the differentiation, then, between core and noncore issues 
guarantees that any award rendered from an enforced arbitration agreement in 
the United States will be enforceable internationally under the New York 
Convention in countries that have the same or even laxer policies. It also 
ensures that any award rendered in a foreign country using a McMahon-esque 
test will be enforceable in the United States under the New York Convention. 
 
 160 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 139, art. V., 
¶ 2; see also Albert Jan van den Berg, The New York Convention of 1958: An Overview, INT’L COUNCIL FOR 
COM. ARB., 19 (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.arbitration-icca.org/media/0/12125884227980/new_york_ 
convention_of_1958_overview.pdf (“Article V(2)(a) permits a court to refuse enforcement of an award on its 
own motion if the subject matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under its  
law . . . . Article V(2)(b) allows a court to refuse enforcement of an award on its own motion if the 
enforcement of the award would be contrary to the public policy of the country where the enforcement is 
sought.”). 
 161 Westbrook, supra note 98, at 648. 
 162 Mahkamat al-Darajat al-Ula [Court of First Instance], Beirut, 19 Mar. 2008, 2 INT’L J. ARAB ARB. 86, 
87 (2008) (Leb.). 
 163 See Tribunale [Court of First Instance], Lodi, 13 Feb. 1991, 21 Y.B. COM. ARB. 580, 582–83 (1996) 
(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Luigi Fumagalli, Mandatory Rules and International Arbitration: 
an Italian Perspective, 16 ASA BULL. 43, 55 n.33 (1998) (“The Tribunale . . . held that the issues under 
examination did not fall within the vis attractiva of the insolvency court (pursuant to Art. 24 of the Italian 
bankruptcy Act, all actions arising out of insolvency proceedings must be brought before the Tribunale that 
declared the bankruptcy). Hence, no Italian provision hindered the arbitration panel from deciding the 
dispute.”). 
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II. A SPLINTERED SYSTEM: WHY REFORM IS NEEDED 
While the current distinction between core and noncore proceedings 
provides centralization, trustee empowerment, and a higher probability of 
enforcement, the distinction does not adequately address the serious 
discrepancies in its application. This shortcoming is magnified by the business’ 
shift from litigation to arbitration, with the former hampering the move. 
A. Split in the Circuit Courts 
The circuit courts have taken different approaches, applying the 
core/noncore distinction, the McMahon test, or their own “sound discretion” 
tests.164 These tests have created inconsistent results. For example, some 
circuits have disavowed the core versus noncore distinction while others have 
used the McMahon test subjectively in reaching decisions.165 Concurrently, 
circuit courts are adopting the Supreme Court’s proarbitration view and thus 
are compelling arbitration to go forward in the context of bankruptcy 
proceedings.166 According to Professor Grant Gilmore, “It is a fairly reliable 
rule of thumb that, when courts with some regularity begin to assign patently 
absurd reasons for the decisions, the decisions themselves are sound and the 
underlying rule of law has fallen out of touch with reality.”167 Such is the case 
here where courts are enforcing arbitration agreements more frequently despite 
constantly tweaking or modifying the current restricting rule. 
1. Core Versus Noncore Split 
Defining what is a core versus noncore claim has been difficult for courts 
and has resulted in disparate classifications. For example, it is hard to predict 
whether a court will find a breach of contract as a core or noncore 
 
 164 See, e.g., Jeremy J. Jacobs, Comment, The FAA Versus the Bankruptcy Code: Further Application of 
McMahon’s “Inherent Conflict” Inquiry in MBNA America Bank v. Hill, 31 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 175, 182–
83 (2007) (“[The Fourth Circuit in In re White Mountain Mining Co.] seemed to provide an easily applicable 
test, directing courts to provide two showings in an effort to fulfill McMahon’s ‘inherent conflict’ inquiry: a 
showing that a core proceeding is involved in both bankruptcy and arbitration, and a showing that enforcement 
of an agreement to arbitrate disputes would hinder efforts by the debtor to obtain relief through the bankruptcy 
process.”). 
 165 See infra Part II.A.1–2. 
 166 See infra Part II.A.1. 
 167 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 20.1 (1965), quoted in Kurth, 
supra note 23, at 1027. 
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proceeding.168 The court in In re Brookhaven Textiles, Inc. held that a breach 
of contract was a core proceeding and did not compel arbitration.169 On the 
other hand, a breach of contract where the defendant is a creditor who had not 
filed a proof of claim or counterclaim is considered to be a noncore 
proceeding,170 which compels arbitration. However, courts still frequently find 
exceptions, as plainly admitted by the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. In In re Gurga, the court held that “even if an 
issue is traditionally a core proceeding, arbitration should be allowed to 
continue if the issue does not implicate the right to bankruptcy, the right to a 
discharge, or some other substantive right created in the Bankruptcy Code.”171 
The courts’ disagreement on how to properly classify a claim as core or 
noncore is alarming because granting arbitration often hinges on this one 
determination. 
Some courts have begun taking the position that the distinction is not even 
necessary. The Third Circuit in In re Mintze held that only where a claim 
turned on a bankruptcy issue did the core and noncore distinction apply.172 
Under the court’s analysis, the distinction does not determine whether a 
bankruptcy court can refuse to enforce an arbitration agreement but “merely 
 
 168 Dameron, supra note 32, at 352 (“[T]here are various holdings on when a breach of contract claim is a 
core or non-core proceeding. These holdings are very fact specific and the slightest change in circumstances 
can affect the determination of a breach of contract claim as a core or non-core proceeding.”). 
 169 See Brookhaven Textiles, Inc. v. Avondale Mills, Inc. (In re Brookhaven Textiles, Inc.), 21 B.R. 204, 
206–07 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Dameron, supra note 32, at 341 (“The court [in In re Brookhaven Textiles] 
stated it had authority to decide the breach of contract issue because it: (1) did not involve a dispute that 
required special expertise of an arbitrator, and (2) the outcome of the case would affect the estate’s assets. 
Even though the arbitration did not implicate bankruptcy law, the court determined the breach of contract case 
was a core proceeding under the Bankruptcy Code. This narrow definition of a core proceeding has been 
followed in other cases.”).  
 170 Dameron, supra note 32, at 342; see also Andrew M. Campbell, Action for Breach of Contract as Core 
Proceeding in Bankruptcy Under 28 U.S.C.S. § 157(b), 123 A.L.R. FED. 103, 131 (1995) (“The court in Hays 
held, in an adversary proceeding in which the defendant had not filed a proof of claim or counterclaimed 
against the estate of the debtor[,] that a count by the trustee in bankruptcy alleging prepetition breach of 
contract was not a core proceeding[] under 28 USCS § 157(b) which the Bankruptcy Court, by referral from 
the District Court, had the power to hear and determine because it did not involve the administration of the 
estate, the allowance of claims, the voidance of fraudulent transfers or preferences, dischargeability, priorities 
of liens or confirmation of a plan, and did not involve substantive rights created by the bankruptcy laws or 
proceedings which could not exist outside of bankruptcy.” (citation omitted)). 
 171 Dameron, supra note 32, at 341 (citing MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Gurga (In re Gurga), 176 B.R. 196, 
199 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)). If the matter to be arbitrated is a bankruptcy matter, then the court should deem it 
a core proceeding and not allow arbitration to proceed. Id. (citing In re Guild Music Corp., 100 B.R. 624, 628 
(Bankr. D.R.I. 1989)). 
 172 See Birney, supra note 21, at 653; see also Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Mintze), 434 
F.3d 222, 229–31 (3d Cir. 2006). 
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determines whether the bankruptcy court has the jurisdiction to make a full 
adjudication.”173 This ruling had the drastic effect of changing how the 
McMahon test is applied, which up until then had primarily been relevant only 
if the bankruptcy court decided a proceeding was core.174 The Third Circuit 
mandated that courts “applying McMahon [are] to disregard the core/noncore 
distinction and distinguish between actions which ‘derive[] from the debtor[,] 
and bankruptcy actions that the Bankruptcy Code created for the benefit of the 
creditors of the estate.’”175 Accordingly, after applying the McMahon test in 
this new context, the Third Circuit found no inherent conflict and held that 
arbitration was the proper venue for resolution of this dispute.176 
Further, in MBNA America Bank, N.A. v. Hill, the Second Circuit took the 
same approach as the Third Circuit in In re Mintze.177 It applied a de novo 
standard of review “rather than a fact finder standard of review . . . , allow[ing] 
the circuit court to take a vastly different inquiry”178 and to arrive at a different 
result than the lower courts. The court stressed that “the outcome of the 
McMahon analysis does not hinge upon a simple classification of proceedings 
as core and noncore[, but rather] . . . ‘requires a particularized inquiry into the 
nature of the claim and the facts of the specific bankruptcy.’”179 After analysis 
of the core claim, the court overturned the bankruptcy court’s decision denying 
arbitration because continuing with the arbitration did not conflict with the 
goals of the Bankruptcy Code.180 
 
 173 In re Mintze, 434 F.3d at 229. 
 174 See supra Part I.A. 
 175 Jacobs, supra note 164, at 186 (second and third alterations in original) (quoting In re Mintze, 434 F.3d 
at 230). If a claim is “derived from the debtor,” the bankruptcy court does not have discretion to allow or reject 
arbitration. If the claim is “for the benefit of the creditors,” then the bankruptcy court may refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements. See id. (quoting In re Mintze, 434 F.3d at 230). 
 176 Birney, supra note 21, at 653 (“[B]ecause the bankruptcy court was not being called upon to adjudicate 
bankruptcy issues in the Mintze adversary proceeding, it could find no inherent conflict between arbitration of 
the debtor’s claims and the underlying purposes of the Bankruptcy Code.” (footnote omitted) (citing In re 
Mintze, 434 F.3d at 231–32 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 177 See Jacobs, supra note 164, at 188–90; see also MBNA Am. Bank, N.A. v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 107–10 
(2d Cir. 2006). 
 178 Jacobs, supra note 164, at 188–89. The circuit courts must first determine that the bankruptcy court 
had discretion in its determination of the particular issue before deciding whether it had used that discretion 
properly. See id. at 189; see infra Part II.C. 
 179 Jacobs, supra note 164, at 189 (quoting Hill, 436 F.3d at 108). The inquiry is based upon three factors: 
the Code’s centralization function, avoiding “piecemeal” litigation, and the bankruptcy court’s enforcement of 
its jurisdiction. The “overwhelming presence of these considerations” will show that Congress intended the 
Code to override other dispute resolution methods, such as arbitration. Id. 
 180 Id. at 190–91 (“First, the court noted the bankruptcy case was closed and discharged, thus arbitration 
of Hill’s claims would not interfere with the objective of the automatic stay provision . . . . Second, the court 
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The Fifth Circuit came to a similar conclusion in In re National Gypsum 
Co., where the court held “that nonenforcement of an otherwise applicable 
arbitration provision turns on the underlying nature of the proceeding, i.e., 
whether the proceeding derives exclusively from the provisions of the 
Bankruptcy Code and, if so, whether arbitration of the proceeding would 
conflict with the purposes of the Code.”181 Based on this analysis, the court 
concluded an inherent conflict is present between the Code and the FAA only 
where the claim arises from the Code.182 
These circuit decisions are part of “[t]he movement toward partially 
divesting bankruptcy courts of authority in the context of enforcing arbitration 
agreements, both in core and noncore proceedings.”183 This movement follows 
the Supreme Court’s overall proarbitration view.184 Only the First Circuit has 
precluded the enforcement of arbitration agreements in all core proceedings,185 
a fair example of which can be seen in In re Guild Music Corp.186 Most other 
courts continue to use the core versus noncore distinction in some capacity in 
deciding whether to compel arbitration.187  
2. Misapplication of the McMahon and Sound Discretion Tests 
The McMahon test determines if arbitration can be compelled for a claim 
arising under a federal statute.188 The third prong of the test allows lower 
courts to decide whether there is a conflict between a core bankruptcy 
proceeding and arbitration. In this way, the third prong essentially functions as 
a “conflicts of purposes test.”189 However, 
 
noted Hill’s choice to treat her claim as a class action undermined any possible assertions that there was an 
indispensable interest in keeping the claim in the bankruptcy arena.” (citing Hill, 436 F.3d at 108)). 
 181 Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. NGC Settlement Trust & Asbestos Claims Management Corp. (In re Nat’l 
Gypsum Co.), 118 F.3d 1056, 1067 (5th Cir. 1997); see also Note, supra note 66, at 2301. 
 182 Note, supra note 66, at 2301. 
 183 See Birney, supra note 21, at 654. 
 184 See supra Introduction. 
 185 See Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 284. 
 186 In re Guild Music Corp., 100 B.R. 624, 628 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1989); Neufeld, supra note 14, at 545–46.  
 187 See Resnick, supra note 59, at 212 (“Most courts, but not all, have distinguished between core and 
noncore proceedings for the purpose of applying McMahon, though they have not adopted per se rules and 
have focused instead on the particular issues in dispute and factual circumstances to determine on a case-by-
case basis whether compulsive arbitration is inconsistent with the underlying policies of the Bankruptcy 
Code.” (citation omitted)); see also supra Part I.A. 
 188 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 524. 
 189 Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 288. 
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[i]nstead of using the conflict of purposes test to weigh the purposes 
of bankruptcy against the purposes of arbitration, . . . a court can 
misuse the test by focusing on how arbitration would conflict with 
the purposes of bankruptcy instead of weighing those purposes 
against the purposes of arbitration, as the Supreme Court intended.190  
This intention can be gleaned from the language of the FAA itself, which states 
that arbitration agreements “shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” unless 
there is something at law or in equity to revoke them.191 The Fourth Circuit in 
In re White Mountain Mining Co. committed the aforementioned error by 
focusing only on those policies protecting bankruptcy proceedings while 
completely ignoring the strong congressional policies and precedent favoring 
arbitration.192 The underlying purpose of the test is not for bankruptcy courts to 
decide what the best forum for an arbitrable dispute is.193 
On the other hand, certain courts do not even use the McMahon test in 
deciding whether to compel arbitration. Instead these courts apply what has 
been dubbed the “sound discretion” standard.194 The court in In re Guy C. 
Long, Inc. allowed arbitration to proceed after applying a four-factor test: 
(1) [T]he arbitration would not jeopardize the debtor’s ability to 
formulate a bankruptcy plan or weaken the debtor’s financial 
situation; (2) the dispute did not implicate bankruptcy issues; (3) the 
breach of contract litigation was initiated by the debtor against the 
noncreditor; and (4) the dispute would be solved more quickly in 
arbitration.195 
However, the factors weighed by the courts differ depending on whether the 
debtor or creditor is the claimant and what the overall effect on the estate 
would be.196 The Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Florida 
 
 190 Id. 
 191 See 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006); see also Kirgis, supra note 10, at 524 (“If a claim is arbitrable and is covered 
by a written arbitration agreement, a court must enforce the agreement unless some legal defense applicable to 
contracts in general would allow for the revocation of the agreement to arbitrate.”). 
 192 Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 288 (citing Phillips v. Congelton (In re White Mountain Mining Co.), 
403 F.3d 164, 169–70 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
 193 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 524. 
 194 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1017–19 (discussing cases leaving the issue to the “sound discretion” of the 
bankruptcy courts).  
 195 Dameron, supra note 32, at 343 (citing Guy C. Long, Inc. v. Park Plaza Dev. Corp. (In re Guy C. 
Long, Inc.), 90 B.R. 99, 102–03 (E.D. Pa. 1988)). The court held that when the four factors are met, the 
inherent conflict between the FAA and Code is weakened. Id.; see also In re Guy C. Long, Inc., 90 B.R. at 
102–03. 
 196 Dameron, supra note 32, at 350; see also Kurth, supra note 23, at 1032–33 (discussing the factors used 
by the Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of New York, which were: “(1) the scope of the arbitration 
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shortened the analysis in In re Bicoastal Corp. and allowed a core claim to 
continue to arbitration for an expert arbitrator to rule on whether a balance 
sheet conformed with generally accepted accounting principles in defense 
contracts, a complex issue not arising from the Code.197  These discrepancies in 
choosing and administrating the McMahon or sound discretion tests arise from 
the discretion of judges and thus lead to unpredictable results which are 
difficult to reconcile with one another. This lack of a uniform mandate from 
the Supreme Court additionally encourages abuse on the part of overworked 
judges: “Anecdotal evidence suggests that bankruptcy judges routinely enforce 
arbitration agreements, for both noncore and core claims, as a way to clear 
matters off the docket.”198 
B. Enforcing International Arbitration Agreements 
One of the dangers of not enforcing arbitration agreements is the 
discouragement of international business transactions. The Supreme Court 
considered this problem in Scherk, opining that not enforcing arbitration 
agreements in the international context “would surely damage the fabric of 
international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of 
businessmen to enter into international agreements.”199 International parties 
choose arbitration because of its predictability, which allows parties to 
circumvent litigation in foreign jurisdictions with unfamiliar laws. The 
predictability is replaced with uncertainty and inconsistency when arbitration is 
not compelled because the Code is allowed to somehow trump the FAA.200 The 
Supreme Court has tried to alleviate this problem by enforcing international 
arbitration even if the agreement would be unenforceable in domestic 
arbitrations.201 However, this solution in and of itself has created a two-fold 
problem: (1) an arbitrary distinction between international and domestic 
arbitrations and (2) noncompliance by the lower courts. 
 
agreement, (2) the need for special expertise, (3) whether the nature and extent of the litigation would make 
the judicial forum preferable to arbitration, and (4) the qualifications of the arbitrator” (citing Wm. S. Newman 
Brewing Co. v. C. Schmidt & Sons, Inc. (In re Wm. S. Newman Brewing Co.), 87 B.R. 236, 241 (Bankr. 
N.D.N.Y. 1988))). 
 197 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1025; see also In re Bicoastal Corp., 111 B.R. 999, 1002–03 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1990) (basing its decision primarily on the benefits of arbitration’s truncated procedures and having an 
arbitrator who is an expert in the field). 
 198 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 520. 
 199 Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 517 (1974), quoted in Neufeld, supra note 14, at 533. 
 200 See Biesterfeld, supra note 13, at 289. 
 201 Id.; see also id. at 281 (“The [Supreme] [C]ourt in Mitsubishi declared that international arbitration 
agreements would be enforced even when a different result would be reached in a domestic tribunal.”). 
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1. International Versus Domestic Arbitration Agreements 
“To date the bankruptcy courts have treated international arbitration as a 
special situation based on the desire to be perceived as a fair and equal player 
in the global marketplace.”202 Because of this concern, courts are more willing 
to compel arbitration where foreign parties are involved.203 It may be the case 
that international cases that are compelled to arbitrate are identical to domestic 
cases where arbitration is halted and parties are forced to adjudicate in the 
bankruptcy forum. These conflicting results are unfair to domestic parties, who 
end up being treated less favorably than foreigners in their own jurisdiction. 
The policy arguments for enforcing arbitration should apply equally in the 
domestic context as in the international context because it ultimately affects all 
business transactions the same. Accordingly, arbitration in domestic cases 
should also be freely granted so as to be on par with their international 
equivalents. 
The extent of this de facto “hall pass” to international arbitration 
agreements is evident, as some courts bypass any traditional analysis and 
instead simply follow the Supreme Court’s decision in Scherk. For example, in 
In re Hart Ski Manufacturing Co., the bankruptcy court enforced arbitration by 
relying on Scherk for the proposition that “[f]ederal law and federal policy 
unequivocally support the enforcement of private arbitration agreements 
entered into by citizens of the United States and foreign nationals.”204 Other 
courts, such as the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel for the Ninth Circuit in In re 
Mor-Ben Insurance Markets Corp., have used a form of the McMahon test to 
compel arbitration in international agreements.205 The court held that, “[a]bsent 
a [c]ongressional mandate to preclude arbitration in the bankruptcy context, or 
a compelling situation seriously affecting the rights of creditors in a 
bankruptcy, a valid clause in an international trade agreement to arbitrate a 
dispute must be enforced.”206 
 
 202 Neufeld, supra note 14, at 557. 
 203 See HOWARD J. STEINBERG, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION § 5:349 (2d ed. 2007), available at Westlaw 
BKRLIT (“Courts have been particularly apt to enforce arbitration clauses contained in international 
agreements. Due to the potential effect on international commerce, international arbitration agreements are 
even more favored than domestic arbitration agreements.”). 
 204 Hart Ski Mfg. Co. v. Maschinefabrik Hennecke, GmbH (In re Hart Ski Mfg. Co.), 18 B.R. 154, 161 
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1982); Neufeld, supra note 14, at 553–54. 
 205 See Mor-Ben Ins. Mkts. Corp. v. Trident Gen. Ins. Co. (In re Mor-Ben Ins. Mkts. Corp.), 73 B.R. 644, 
648–49 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987); Neufeld, supra note 14, at 555 (“The [Mor-Ben] court applied the analysis first 
elaborated in Mitsubishi and later developed in McMahon . . . .”). 
 206 In re Mor-Ben Ins. Mkts. Corp., 73 B.R. at 649, quoted in Neufeld, supra note 14, at 555.  
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Another likely possibility is that international arbitrations in bankruptcy 
proceedings are treated differently not just because of their effect on business 
but also because bankruptcy courts lack the proper jurisdiction. For a court to 
mandate the automatic stay, both in personam jurisdiction over the parties and 
in rem jurisdiction over the estate are required.207 If the property of the debtor 
is outside the United States, it is extremely difficult for the court to exercise in 
rem jurisdiction.208 The only way for bankruptcy courts to protect the debtor’s 
assets domestically against foreign creditors requires in personam jurisdiction 
over those creditors, which it may lack as demonstrated in the pre-Code case, 
Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co.209  
Fotochrome, incorporated in New York, entered into a distribution 
agreement with Copal, a Japanese company, where Fotochrome was to buy and 
distribute Copal’s cameras; the deal contained an arbitration clause.210 A 
dispute arose, leading the parties to accuse one other of violating the contract; 
shortly thereafter, Copal pursued arbitration in Japan as required by the 
arbitration clause.211 Before arbitration proceedings concluded, Fotochrome 
filed chapter XI, and the court issued a stay against continuing arbitration; 
however, the “arbitral tribunal determined that it was not bound by the stay and 
proceeded to issue an arbitral award in favor of Copal for over $600,000.”212 
Fotochrome challenged the award, and the referee in the bankruptcy court 
ruled that because of the stay restricting the arbitration proceedings from 
commencing, the bankruptcy court could reconsider the merits of the claim.213 
The district court reversed and the Second Circuit affirmed on the key point 
that a stay is not effective against a foreign creditor such as Copal who does 
not meet the minimum contacts requirement to establish in personam 
jurisdiction.214 Therefore, such arbitral awards are binding and are 
 
 207 David P. Stromes, Note, The Extraterritorial Reach of the Bankruptcy Code’s Automatic Stay: Theory 
vs. Practice, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 277, 284 (2007). 
 208 See id. (“In actuality, the courts of the country in which the property is physically located are the only 
entities that can determine what will happen to that property.”). 
 209 See Fotochrome, Inc. v. Copal Co., 517 F.2d 512, 516–17 (2d Cir. 1975); Stromes, supra note 207, at 
284. 
 210 Westbrook, supra note 98, at 602. 
 211 Fotochrome, Inc., 517 F.2d at 514 (“Copal claimed damages of $631,501 for Fotochrome’s breach of 
conditions in the contract and its failure to pay for delivered cameras; Fotochrome claimed damages of 
$828,582 for Copal’s failure to meet the delivery schedule and for its manufacture of defective cameras.”). 
 212 Westbrook, supra note 98, at 602. 
 213 Id. 
 214 Id. at 602–03; see also Fotochrome, Inc., 517 F.2d at 515–16, 520 (“Nor can it be argued that the stay 
must have affected the arbitration because of the Bankruptcy Court’s jurisdiction over the debtor’s assets.”). 
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unreviewable on their merits by the bankruptcy courts.215 Even if a court does 
find it has in personam jurisdiction, it will be hard to enforce any sanctions 
against the foreign party.216  
2. Noncompliance with Scherk 
While Scherk strongly implies that international commercial arbitration 
agreements should be enforced in spite of subsequent bankruptcy proceedings, 
not all courts have fully embraced this theory. For example, in In re United 
States Lines, Inc., the Second Circuit had to decide whether “to compel foreign 
arbitration of the trustee’s adversary proceeding seeking a declaratory 
judgment as to the debtor’s rights in certain insurance policies.”217 The court 
recognized the importance of Mitsubishi and even explicitly admitted that there 
is a strong policy favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements in the 
international context.218 However, after deeming the dispute a core proceeding, 
the court refused to compel arbitration, “[a]pparently fearing that arbitration 
might produce a result leaving the estate barren.”219 A similar analysis 
occurred in In re White Mountain Mining Co., where the Fourth Circuit refused 
to compel the international arbitration agreement because “the issues to be 
addressed in the proceedings would directly affect the reorganization process 
as well as ascertain ‘the extent of equity holders in the entity.’ Accordingly, the 
court determined ‘the core proceeding trumped the arbitration . . . .’”220 
Thus, courts are still using the core and noncore distinction as a way to 
refuse to compel international commercial arbitration agreements. Doing so, 
these courts ignore the potentially harmful effects on business transactions, in 
 
 215 Fotochrome, Inc., 517 F.2d at 516.  
 216 See, e.g., Stromes, supra note 207, at 285–86 (“Because Andrea [Shipping, one of the defendants,] was 
not a U.S.-based entity, the U.S. court was limited with regard to the sanctions it could realistically enforce 
against Andrea. Any sanctions that the court did impose would only be effective if Andrea had assets 
physically located in the United States—otherwise, Andrea (absent a court order form its country of 
incorporation) would have no incentive to submit to sanctions of a U.S. court.” (footnotes omitted) (discussing 
Lykes Bros. S.S. Co. v. Hanseatic Marine Serv., GmBH (In re Lykes Bros. S.S. Co.), 207 B.R. 282 (Bankr. 
M.D. Fla. 1997))). 
 217 José Rosell & Harvey Prager, International Arbitration and Bankruptcy: United States, France and the 
ICC, 18 J. INT’L ARB. 417, 419 (2001); see also Kirgis, supra note 10, at 540. 
 218 U.S. Lines, Inc. v. Am. S.S. Owners Mut. Prot. & Indem. Ass’n (In re U.S. Lines, Inc.), 197 F.3d 631, 
639 (2d Cir. 1999). 
 219 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 540 (citing In re U.S. Lines, Inc., 197 F.3d at 638–41). 
 220 Jacobs, supra note 164, at 182 (footnote omitted) (quoting Phillips v. Congelton, L.L.C. (In re White 
Mountain Mining Co.), 403 F.3d 164, 167 (4th Cir. 2005)). 
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spite of the Supreme Court’s expressed and unequivocal concerns.221 These 
erratic and sometimes negative results may make foreign parties weary of 
entering into any sort of an agreement with a United States business. Domestic 
businesses are also forced to think twice before spending time negotiating over 
a potentially unenforceable arbitration clause.  
C. Monitoring Discretion 
Bankruptcy proceedings have three guaranteed levels of review: the 
bankruptcy court in the first instance, an appeal to the district court, and lastly 
an appeal to the circuit court.222 Circuit courts are concerned over possible 
abuses of discretion by the bankruptcy judges in their rulings compelling or 
denying arbitration and therefore have advanced standards of review for how 
the issue should be appraised. For example, in In re White Mountain Mining 
Co., the circuit court reviewed the bankruptcy court’s determination for an 
abuse of discretion by considering the lower court’s findings of fact under the 
clearly erroneous standard.223 However, the Third Circuit in In re Mintze 
decided that it first must determine whether the bankruptcy court had any 
discretion to exercise before they determined whether such discretion was in 
fact abused, applying the de novo standard to this initial inquiry.224 In the 
analysis outlined by the Third Circuit, “if the bankruptcy court ha[d] properly 
considered the conflicting policies in accordance with the law, [the court of 
appeals was to] acknowledge the [bankruptcy court’s] exercise of discretion 
and show due deference to its determination that arbitration [would] seriously 
jeopardize a particular core bankruptcy proceeding.”225 If the appellate court 
 
 221 See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516–17 (1974) (“A parochial refusal by the courts of 
one country to enforce an international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes 
[(orderliness and predictability in international business transactions, preventing undue submission to hostile 
or ignorant forums)], but would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to secure 
tactical litigation advantages . . . . [T]he dicey atmosphere of such a legal no-man’s-land would surely damage 
the fabric of international commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen to enter 
into international commercial agreements.”). 
 222 See Resnick, supra note 59, at 212. If the circuit has established one, the parties can also take their 
appeal to the circuit’s bankruptcy appellate panel. See 28 U.S.C. § 158(b)(1) (2006). 
 223 See In re White Mountain Mining Co., 403 F.3d at 169–70; see also Jacobs, supra note 164, at 185. 
 224 Jacobs, supra note 164, at 185 (citing Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 
222, 228 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
 225 Id. at 188–89 (alterations in original) (quoting MBNA Am. Bank v. Hill, 436 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 
2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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finds an abuse of discretion, it can reverse the decision226 and ultimately 
compel the arbitration. 
Most often, the abuse of discretion stems from bankruptcy judges’ 
unfounded mistrust of other adjudicatory forums such as arbitration. The 
Supreme Court in Mitsubishi said, “By agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a 
party does not forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only 
submits to their resolution in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”227 
Bankruptcy judges often have difficulty accepting this premise; for them, the 
question comes down to which forum is most qualified to hear the case.228 
Judges deem these two forums—the arbitral and the judicial—as having 
competing interests, and therefore judges choose the courts to shield 
bankruptcy issues from arbitrators.229 Even though the Supreme Court “has 
made it abundantly clear that fears about arbitral competence are not grounds 
for refusing to enforce otherwise valid arbitration agreements,”230 arbitrators 
still possess a stigma as unprepared or incompetent to deal with issues that will 
affect complex bankruptcies.231 No matter the ripple effect that arbitral awards 
may have on other creditors and the judicial system, strong congressional 
policy232 and Supreme Court precedent favoring arbitration in a host of 
settings233 compel a similar enforcement of arbitration agreements in 
 
 226 Kurth, supra note 23, at 1033 n.230 (“An appellate court may reverse these decisions only if the 
bankruptcy judges abused their discretion.”). 
 227 Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 473, 628 (1985), quoted in Kirgis, 
supra note 10, at 540. 
 228 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 525. 
 229 See id. (“[Judges] conclude that the only way to protect bankruptcy is to prevent the arbitration process 
from going forward in cases with the potential to significantly impact the bankruptcy proceedings.”). 
 230 Id. at 540. 
 231 See, e.g., Culhane, supra note 69, at 496 (“Arbitration substitutes arbitrators, who are less skilled in the 
relevant law and possibly inclined to favor particular creditors, for experienced and expert bankruptcy 
judges.”). 
 232 See, e.g., 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–4 (2006) (making arbitration agreements “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, 
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract” and requiring courts to 
stay trials or enforce valid arbitration agreements if either party petitions the court). 
 233 See, e.g., AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1748–53 (2011) (allowing waiver of 
class arbitration in contracts of adhesion); Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 
484–85 (1989) (allowing arbitration of claim under Securities Act of 1933); Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. 
McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 238, 242 (1987) (allowing arbitration of claims under RICO and Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628–29, 
638–40 (1985) (allowing arbitration of antitrust claims arising from international commercial contract); Scherk 
v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 515–20 (1974) (allowing arbitration of claims under Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 in international commercial contract).  
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bankruptcy. As appellate courts move in the direction of the Supreme Court’s 
proarbitration policy,234 the abuse of discretion test is vitally important. 
Where an abuse of discretion is found and arbitration is eventually 
compelled, any past bankruptcy proceeding turns out to be both inefficient and 
costly, with the parties having spent time and money going through the 
adjudicatory process all the way to the court of appeals and, after a 
determination that the claim is arbitable, needing to spend even more time and 
money on arbitration. On the other hand, prevention of abuse may be a futile 
process if the circuit judges share the same negative opinions of arbitration as 
the lower court judges. This results in parties spending time and money going 
through appeals in vain. 
Instead of trying to prevent abuse at the bankruptcy court level, district 
courts and circuit courts should concentrate their efforts on reviewing arbitral 
awards for errors as more disputes, both in the bankruptcy and nonbankruptcy 
setting, are shifting towards arbitration.235 In addition to the statutory grounds 
outlined in section 10 of the FAA for vacating an arbitral award,236 courts have 
also invoked the doctrine of “manifest disregard of the law” as an 
extrastatutory method of review.237 Simply, this standard requires more than 
just a mere error in the application of the law; rather, the mistake must have 
been so obvious that a reasonable arbitrator would have easily seen it.238 
Furthermore, courts have also noted that the word “disregard” requires that the 
arbitrator knew of a binding and applicable legal principle but chose to ignore 
it regardless.239 While there is no set test under this doctrine, “[m]ost [courts] 
require evidence of a conscious decision by the arbitrator to decide contrary to 
a clearly applicable governing rule, making the test extremely difficult to 
satisfy.”240 The losing party in arbitration will often seek judicial review under 
this doctrine; however, in most cases it is futile.241 The other nonstatutory 
ground for vacating arbitral awards is public policy; however, many cases 
suggest “an extremely narrow ground for public policy review of arbitral 
 
 234 See, e.g., Mintze v. Am. Gen. Fin. Servs., Inc. (In re Mintze), 434 F.3d 222, 230–32 (3d Cir. 2006). 
 235 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 540 (“This process—of allowing arbitration to proceed and then 
reviewing the award on public policy grounds—would give effect to the FAA, respect the parties’ contractual 
commitments, and still allow a Bankruptcy Court to protect the integrity of the bankruptcy system.”). 
 236 See 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2006); see also infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
 237 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 531–32. 
 238 See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, 808 F.2d 930, 933 (2d Cir. 1986). 
 239 See id. 
 240 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 531–32. 
 241 Id. 
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awards: [a]n award may be vacated on public policy grounds only if a party 
can show that the award contravenes a specific rule of law.”242 
Recently, the continued viability of these nonstatutory grounds of review 
has been questioned after the Supreme Court’s decision in Hall Street 
Associates v. Mattel, Inc.243 The Court held that judicial review of arbitral 
awards should be conducted using sections 10 and 11 of the FAA 
exclusively.244 However, the Court did not clearly reject or accept the 
nonstatutory grounds of review.245 As arbitration continues to grow, it only 
becomes more imperative for the enforcing courts to establish a proper system 
of review to ensure that arbitral awards are free from error or abuse instead of 
concentrating their efforts on abuse of discretion in bankruptcy proceedings. 
III.  RESOLVING THE CONFLICT: ARBITRATION TRUMPS THE CODE 
The current framework for trying to resolve the conflict between the FAA 
and the Code is convoluted, with tests, factors, and distinctions that lead to 
inconsistent results among the circuits.246 While there are valid concerns about 
not adjudicating all creditor claims in one centralized proceeding,247 these do 
not outweigh the need for uniformity. The way to end the conflict and allow 
for parties to achieve the best results is to lift the automatic stay and enforce 
parties’ bargained for arbitration agreements in all bankruptcy proceedings. In 
making the arbitration agreement, the parties have demonstrated the intent to 
settle all disputes through arbitration, regardless of any future bankruptcy 
filings. The Ninth Circuit recognized this in In re Mor-Ben Insurance Markets 
Corp., stating, “[T]he fact that these [breach of contract] issues arise in the 
context of a bankruptcy does not invalidate the agreement of the parties to have 
the dispute heard by an arbitrator . . . .”248 At the conclusion of the properly 
 
 242 Id. at 532–33 (citing E. Associated Coal Corp. v. United Mine Workers of Am., 531 U.S. 57 (2000); 
United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29 (1987)). 
 243 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 533–34. 
 244 Id. 
 245 Id.; see also Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 584–86, 590–91 (2008). The Court implied 
that manifest disregard might be read as an alternative way of discussing FAA sections 10 and 11 and did not 
specifically address the public policy exception. Kirgis, supra note 10, at 533–34. 
 246 See supra Part II.A–B. 
 247 See supra Part I.B. 
 248 Mor-Ben Ins. Mkts. Corp. v. Trident Gen. Ins. Co. (In re Mor-Ben Ins. Mkts. Corp.), 73 B.R. 644, 648 
(B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1987). 
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compelled arbitration, the award should proceed to the bankruptcy court for 
enforcement249 and final confirmation of the award amount. 
Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice came to the same conclusion, adopting a 
policy of unequivocally compelling arbitration even in the face of bankruptcy 
proceedings in the “landmark” case involving Interclínicas Planos de Saúde 
SA and Saúde ABC Servicos Medicos Hospitalares Ltda.250 The court outlined 
several reasons for this position. First, the court pressed the point that at the 
time commercial parties agree to arbitrate future disputes, they do so in their 
full capacity and therefore these agreements are not invalidated after 
bankruptcy is filed.251 Second, the court determined that arbitration affords 
parties all the same rights and defenses as they would have in bankruptcy 
proceedings: “The arbitration can go forward and the procedural rights of the 
entity in liquidation are in no way harmed, because the rules applicable to 
arbitration proceedings fully protect the due process rights of the parties.”252 
There is no reason why a debtor and creditor could not fruitfully participate in 
arbitration proceedings just as they would in litigation.253 Indeed, 
“arbitration . . . increasingly resemble[s] litigation, with its extensive discovery 
and motion practice”254 and the provision of some form of evidence rules.255 
Third, because the debtor can bring all suitable defenses against this claim in 
 
 249 See Kirgis, supra note 10, at 538–39 (“When a Bankruptcy Court compels arbitration of a claim 
disputed in the bankruptcy proceeding, it becomes the court to which the parties apply for enforcement in the 
first instance . . . . [At this point,] the Bankruptcy Court should normally enter the award as a judgment or refer 
it to the district court for entry as a judgment. But [the court] also has the power to review the award to 
determine, among other things, whether the award is in violation of public policy.”). 
 250 Arnoldo Wald & Rodrigo Garcia Da Fonseca, Arnoldo Wald and Rodrigo Garcia Da Fonseca on the 
“Interclínicas Case”: Brazil’s Superior Court of Justice Rules on the Arbitrability of Disputes Involving 
Bankrupt Companies and Reaffirms the Principle of Kompetenz-Kompetenz, 2008 LEXISNEXIS EMERGING 
ISSUES ANALYSIS 2780, at 4–5 (2008). 
 251 Id. at 4 (“Another relevant issue pointed in Justice Andrighi’s opinion is that, in the case at hand, the 
arbitration clause was agreed to before the decree of the extrajudicial liquidation of the company. There can be 
no doubt that it was a valid contractual provision at the time it was agreed to, entered into between two 
companies in a commercial setting.”). 
 252 Id. Given that the party can be protected adequately in arbitration, it should not be allowed to avoid 
arbitrating by claiming a breach its due process rights. See Jennifer Kirby & Denis Bensaude, A View from 
Paris, MEALEY’S INT’L ARB. REP., Aug. 2009, at 1, 6 (“Where a party refuses to participate in arbitral 
proceedings, the French Supreme Court explained, that party is both estopped from arguing that the 
proceedings breached due process and must be considered to have waived its right to complain on this score.”). 
 253 See Wald & Garcia Da Fonseca, supra note 250, at 4. 
 254 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 534. 
 255 See, e.g., COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES & MEDIATION PROCEDURES R-31(b) (Am. Arbitration 
Ass’n 2009), available at http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=22440 (“The arbitrator shall determine the 
admissibility, relevance, and materiality of the evidence offered and may exclude evidence deemed by the 
arbitrator to be cumulative or irrelevant.”). 
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arbitration just as it would in litigation, this protects the value of the estate for 
the other creditors.256 Lastly, protection is ultimately available to the parties 
through the enforcement action.257 
At this enforcement stage, the party opposing the award can invoke all the 
available defenses against enforcement. In domestic arbitrations, section 10 of 
the FAA provides numerous grounds for district courts to vacate the award.258 
Similarly, for international arbitrations, Article V of the New York Convention 
provides grounds for which enforcement may be refused.259 “The German 
courts have repeatedly held that the catalogue of grounds for refusal outlined in 
Article V of the New York Convention is exhaustive.”260 Even though courts 
are limited to their review of the award under these two statutes,261 they “have 
found several non-statutory grounds for vacating awards because of decisional 
errors committed by the arbitrator,” such as the manifest disregard of the law 
and public policy exceptions that still exist in some form today.262 
Accordingly, parties have various legal avenues through which they can rectify 
any mistakes arising from the arbitration and do not need bankruptcy law to 
shield them.263 
If a bankruptcy judge determines there are no grounds on which to vacate 
the arbitration award, the next step would be to confirm the amount of the 
award, which is similar to the procedure in France. There, an arbitral tribunal 
 
 256 See Wald & Garcia Da Fonseca, supra note 250, at 4. 
 257 See id. (“The ruling of the Superior Court of Justice in the Interclínicas Case stresses, moreover, that 
Arbitral Tribunals do not have the legal power to enforce their own awards, which need to be taken to court in 
case the loser resists compliance, and there are legal remedies available to the parties to correct any possible 
wrongdoings in the arbitration.”). 
 258 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (2006). 
 259 See Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 139, 
art. 5, ¶ 1 (“1. Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused, at the request of the party against 
whom it is invoked, only if that party furnishes to the competent authority where the recognition and 
enforcement is sought, proof that: . . . (c) The award deals with a difference not contemplated by or not falling 
within the terms of the submission to arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the 
submission to arbitration, provided that, if the decisions on matters submitted to arbitration can be separated 
from those not so submitted, that part of the award which contains decisions on matters submitted to 
arbitration may be recognized and enforced . . . .”). 
 260 Wolfgang Kühn, Current Issues on the Application of the New York Convention—A German 
Perspective, 25 J. INT’L ARB. 743, 754 (2008) (“The Brandenburg Court of Appeal, for example, had to the 
face the question whether the opening of bankruptcy proceedings constituted a ground for refusal of 
enforcement. It answered the question in the negative, as none of the grounds for refusal outlined in Article V 
applied, and therefore the enforcement was granted.”). 
 261 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
 262 Kirgis, supra note 10, at 531; see also supra Part II.C. 
 263 See Wald & Garcia Da Fonseca, supra note 250, at 5. 
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may allow the arbitration to continue while the debtor is involved in 
bankruptcy proceedings, but in some cases it may be hesitant to render an 
award ordering payment.264 Instead, the tribunal decides the validity and value 
of the award, and the court enforces it.265 Applying this concept in American 
bankruptcy proceedings, the bankruptcy judge would be able to confirm the 
arbitrator’s award amount or reject it if it too heavily skews the recovery of the 
other creditors. This balanced and simple review system is preferable to the 
current confusing framework because it allows the parties to arbitrate as they 
contracted for, protects third party creditors’ recovery, and advances 
bankruptcy law to meet the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence favoring arbitration 
for disputes under federal statutes. 
CONCLUSION 
“Parties enter into arbitration agreements because they recognize that they 
cannot foresee all possible eventualities and disputes that might arise, and that 
it would not be efficient to provide for all eventualities even if they could be 
anticipated.”266 Parties cannot foresee the possibility that they will one day end 
up in bankruptcy proceedings and the arbitration agreement they agreed to will 
be invalidated. Many courts recognize the need to compel arbitration but only 
if it meets their standards under the core versus noncore distinction, McMahon 
test, or sound discretion.267 However, these mechanisms have serious 
drawbacks and lead to inconsistent results.268 The bankruptcy regime generally 
fails to acknowledge the overall shift in favor of arbitration, which has serious 
effects on domestic and international business transactions. Bankruptcy law is 
once again in need of reform: as litigation is fading and arbitration is taking 
center stage as the primary means of dispute resolution, it must be made clear 
that such agreements are to be enforced in bankruptcy proceedings. 
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